Discounting Financial Literacy: Time Preferences and Participation in Financial Education Programs by Meier, Stephan & Sprenger, Charles
IZA DP No. 3507
Discounting Financial Literacy: Time Preferences



























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study
of Labor
May 2008 
Discounting Financial Literacy: 
Time Preferences and Participation in 




Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 
and IZA  
 
Charles Sprenger 












P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 











Discounting Financial Literacy: Time Preferences and 
Participation in Financial Education Programs
*
 
Many policy makers and economists argue that financial literacy is key to financial well-being. 
But why do many individuals remain financially illiterate despite the apparent importance of 
being financially informed? This paper presents results of a field study linking individual 
decisions to acquire personal financial information to a critical, and normally unobservable, 
characteristic: time preferences. We offered a short, free credit counseling and information 
program to more than 870 individuals. About 55 percent chose to participate. Independently, 
we elicited time preferences using incentivized choice experiments both for individuals who 
selected into the program and those who did not. Our results show that the two groups differ 
sharply in their measured discount factors. Individuals who choose to acquire personal 
financial information through the credit counseling program discount the future less than 
individuals who choose not to participate. Our results suggest that individual time preference 
may explain who will and who will not choose to become financially literate. This has 
implications for the validity of studies evaluating voluntary financial education programs and 
policy efforts focused on expanding financial education. 
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Bank of Boston. 1 Introduction
In personal ﬁnance, as in other areas of decision-making, information is thought to be
a good thing. Financially literate individuals make fewer mistakes and are in better
ﬁnancial condition than ﬁnancial illiterates (for surveys, see Lusardi and Mitchell,
2007; Bernanke, 2006). Based on the positive association between ﬁnancial outcomes
and ﬁnancial knowledge, policymakers promote educational programs, such as credit
counseling, homeownership classes, and retirement seminars. The fact that the new
bankruptcy law in the U.S. requires individuals to undergo credit counseling illustrates
the importance that policymakers place on providing information about personal ﬁ-
nance.1
Despite the apparent importance of ﬁnancial literacy, many individuals remain ﬁ-
nancially illiterate. Evidence shows that a large number of individuals lack even basic
ﬁnancial understanding. Individuals generally score poorly on ﬁnancial literacy exams
(see, for example, National Council on Economic Education, 2005; Mandell, 2004) and
fail to understand ﬁnancial instruments (see, John Hancock Financial Services, 2002).2
Furthermore, Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) show that only around half of individuals in
the Health and Retirement Survey are able to answer two simple questions on inﬂation
and compound interest. It remains an open question why, if acquiring ﬁnancial infor-
mation is so critical to ﬁnancial well-being, many individuals do not choose to become
more ﬁnancially informed.
Very little evidence exists exploring the decision processes underlying the acquisi-
tion of ﬁnancial information. The acquisition of ﬁnancial information, like voluntary
education in general, can be viewed as an investment in human capital. Individuals be-
come ﬁnancially literate, incurring costs in the present, with an expectation of returns
1A debtor may be eligible for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 law only if he or she has participated in
an approved credit counseling session in the previous 180 days. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 109, 111 for details.
2For a survey on the state of ﬁnancial literacy, see Lusardi (2006) and papers cited therein.
2on this human capital investment in future periods. As such, time preference should
play a role in determining whether or not an individual chooses to acquire personal
ﬁnancial information. Individuals who heavily discount the future should be less likely
to invest in ﬁnancial education than those who don’t discount the future as much. In
this paper, we test this hypothesis and show that an individual’s discount factor is
highly correlated with the acquisition of personal ﬁnancial information.
Our evidence comes from a ﬁeld study implemented in cooperation with the City
of Boston and a large credit counseling ﬁrm that oﬀered ﬁnancial information, in the
form of a short credit counseling session, to more than 870 individuals. The counseling
session included an overview of the individual’s credit report, with their credit score,
along with useful credit information. Independently, we elicited the time preferences of
all individuals to whom the program was oﬀered, using incentivized choice experiments.
The design of the study allows us to correlate measured discount factors with the
decision to take-up the oﬀered credit counseling program.
Analyzing the acquisition of ﬁnancial information in this framework has several
advantages. First, the outcome variable (that is, whether individuals choose to receive
the counseling session) is an objectively observable behavioral measure. The partic-
ipation decision does not depend on cognitive or learning abilities (as some ﬁnancial
literacy tests do), and the program is designed to have very low costs for participants
(described below). Second, the topic is particularly relevant. Knowledge about credit
scoring and one’s credit score is very important in the United States for ﬁnancial deci-
sions, since credit scores are used to determine not only whether one gets a loan, but
also the interest rate. In addition, credit reports may legally be used by employers,
landlords, and insurance companies in their decision-making (see 15 U.S.C. §1681b).
In the ﬁeld study, only about 55 percent of individuals chose to receive a free
credit score and participate in the short credit counseling session. We show that this
3participation decision is highly correlated with individual time preference; individuals
who have higher discount factors are more likely to opt into the program. This result is
robust to controlling for a number of socio-demographic characteristics, such as income
and education.
Additionally, we show that time preference inﬂuences information acquisition prior
to receipt of the oﬀer of the small intervention in the ﬁeld study. More patient individu-
als are more likely to know what a credit score is. Controlling for this prior information
acquisition, however, has little eﬀect on the strong correlation between time preference
and the participation decision.
That we ﬁnd a positive correlation between patience and acquisition of ﬁnancial
information may help to explain why some individuals remain ﬁnancially illiterate.
Financial literacy is an investment in human capital. Those who heavily discount the
future will heavily discount the beneﬁt of being ﬁnancially literate and so will ﬁnd
acquiring ﬁnancial information not to be an attractive investment.
Our results have at least two further implications. First, our results speak to the
presence of selection eﬀects in the evaluation of ﬁnancial programs. Previous research
has found that, in general, more patient individuals have better ﬁnancial outcomes,
since they search longer for a good job (DellaVigna and Paserman, 2005), experience
steeper wage growth (Munasinghe and Sicherman, 2006), take up welfare programs ear-
lier (Fang and Silverman, 2006), have higher credit scores, and are less likely to default
on their loans (Meier and Sprenger, 2006). This indicates that patient individuals who
acquire ﬁnancial information are already on the path to better outcomes. If the mea-
sured eﬀects of ﬁnancial information interventions do not rely on randomization, then
their observed educational eﬀects are most likely overestimated. Because few studies
can solve this selection problem,3 we believe there is very limited unbiased evidence on
3There are a few notable exceptions. For example, Bernheim et al. (2001) and Cole and Shastry
(2007) use changes in state level mandates for ﬁnancial curriculum in high schools as an identiﬁcation
4whether ﬁnancial information interventions have a positive eﬀect.
Second, an expansion of voluntary ﬁnancial programs will continue to miss certain
consumers. Voluntary programs are considered by some to be a helpful step in creating
better ﬁnancial outcomes for an increasing number of people (see, for example, Braun-
stein and Welch, 2002). We suggest not only that the expansion of these programs
may reach only a limited number of individuals, but also that such programs will not
be attractive to the target population of ﬁnancial illiterates. If this is the case, policy
makers face signiﬁcant diﬃculty in addressing ﬁnancial illiteracy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the design of the
ﬁeld study and of the choice experiments, Section 3 presents the results, and Section 4
concludes by elaborating on the paper’s policy implications.
2 Design of Field Study
Our results are based on a unique ﬁeld study that measures an individual’s discount
factor regardless of his or her decision to participate in a ﬁnancial education program,
and investigates who selects into the educational program.
2.1 Design of Financial Education Program
The study took place at a Volunteer Income Tax Assistance (VITA) site in Roxbury, a
neighborhood in Boston, Massachusetts.4 Jointly with the City of Boston and a large
credit counseling corporation, we oﬀered 872 individuals a free TransUnion & Co. credit
strategy and come to diﬀering conclusions about the eﬀect of ﬁnancial education on future savings. Du-
ﬂo and Saez (2003) oﬀer randomized incentives to participate in a savings seminar and show that the
eﬀects, although positive, are extremely small. See also Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) for a survey.
4There are currently 23 VITA sites in and around Boston, MA. Coordinated by a city-wide coalition
of government and business leaders, VITA sites provide free tax preparation assistance to low-to-
moderate income (LMI) households. Taxes are prepared by volunteers throughout tax season, from
late January to mid-April each year.
5report (including their Fair Issac Corporation (FICO) score), a short overview of how
to read a credit report (for information about credit reports, see Avery et al. (2003)),
and several key steps they could take to improve or maintain their credit rating. All
tax ﬁlers entering the VITA site were oﬀered the short credit session.
The exact procedure in the ﬁeld study was as follows: ﬁrst, all taxpayers entering
the Roxbury VITA site during the times we conducted the study were asked whether
they wanted to receive a free, short credit counseling session (including their credit
score) while waiting for a volunteer to help them with their taxes. Participation was
almost costless in the sense that we paid for the monetary cost of the credit report;
individuals were explicitly informed that the credit report involved was a so-called “soft
inquiry” that would not aﬀect their score; and most individuals already had to wait
quite a long time at the tax sites for their taxes to be prepared (so opportunity costs
of participating were minimal). Furthermore, concerns about identity theft are very
unlikely to aﬀect the decision to receive counseling since individuals come to the VITA
site voluntarily and entrust all their personal information to the volunteers at the site
for tax ﬁling purposes. Individuals could choose to receive the short counseling session
at any point in the process.
Second, independent of whether they opted to receive the counseling session, indi-
viduals received a preparatory packet with forms for their taxes, a survey with some
socio-demographic and other information, and a set of multiple price lists to enable us
to measure time preferences.
Third, we explained to all individuals how to ﬁll in the price lists and how the
payment mechanism for the price lists would work (more details about the price lists
are given below).
Fourth, individuals ﬁlled out the surveys and completed the price lists. Those who
elected to participate then received a short one-on-one credit counseling session. The
6session lasted no more than 15 minutes, and individuals had been informed of this fact
before deciding to participate. Upon completion of the credit counseling session, a tax
preparation volunteer helped the individual to ﬁle his or her taxes. Individuals who
decided to receive the free credit counseling did not lose their place in the line for tax
preparation, and all individuals were informed of this in advance.
We acquired the following information for 872 individuals: (i) whether they partic-
ipated in the short credit counseling program, (ii) a measure of their time preferences,
and (iii) their income situation, from their tax ﬁling. Additionally, we obtain informa-
tion on the day when individuals were oﬀered the ﬁnancial education program in the
VITA site. This enables us to control for day-speciﬁc waiting times and potential social
interaction eﬀects. (iv) For a substantial number of the individuals in our study, we
also have a complete record of the socio-demographic characteristics reported from the
preparatory survey mentioned above. This survey included questions on the individ-
ual’s gender, race, education, whether the individual has at least one credit card, the
outstanding balances on all credit cards, information on knowledge of English, whether
the individual expects to move in the next seven months, and the individual’s willing-
ness to take risks. The survey also includes a question on prior ﬁnancial knowledge.
Individuals were asked: “Do you know what a credit score is?” The answers to this
yes/no question are used to determine whether time preferences correlate with infor-
mation acquisition prior to the ﬁeld study, and whether inclusion of prior knowledge
can explain the association between time preferences and the decision to participate in
the credit counseling program.
The average individual in the ﬁeld study is around 38 years of age, African-
American, female, has no college experience, annual disposable income of around
$17,000, and 0.5 dependents (see Column (1) of Table 1). The study therefore fo-
cuses on low-to-moderate-income (LMI) individuals. This non-standard subject pool
7is of particular interest for the research question at hand, ﬁrst, as there are very few
experimental studies focusing solely on the behavior of LMI families in developed coun-
tries (an exception is Eckel et al., 2005) and, second, as their relatively insecure ﬁnancial
position puts them at great ﬁnancial risk to health and income shocks (see Bertrand et
al., 2004). As Campbell (2006, p. 1554) notes “... for many households, the discrep-
ancies between observed and ideal behavior have relatively minor consequences ...; for
a minority of households, particularly poorer and less educated households, there are
larger discrepancies with potentially serious consequences.”
2.2 Measuring Time Preferences
Participants’ time preferences were measured with incentivized choice experiments (for
similar approaches, see Harrison et al., 2002; McClure et al., 2004; Dohmen et al., 2006;
Meier and Sprenger, 2006; Benjamin et al., 2007, and for a survey on measuring time
preferences, see Frederick et al. (2002)). Individuals were asked to make 22 choices
between a smaller reward ($X < $50) in period t and a larger reward ($50) in period
t + τ > t. The amount X varied from $49 to $14. We use three time sets. In two of
the price lists, t is the present (t = 0) and τ, the delay, is either one month (τ = 1) or
six months (τ = 6). In the third price list, t is delayed six months (t = 6) and τ is one
month (τ = 1). (See the appendix for the instructions and the multiple price lists.)
The multiple price list setup (see, for example, Harrison et al., 2005) enables us
to measure an individual’s discount factor (IDF)5 for three diﬀerent time frames by
looking at the point, X∗, at which individuals switch from opting for the smaller,
sooner payment to the larger, later payment, in a given price list. That is, a discount
factor is taken from the last point at which an individual prefers the sooner, smaller
5In the paper, we use the individual discount factor (IDF) instead of the individual discount rate
(IDR): IDF=1/(1+IDR).
8payment. For example, if an individual prefers $45 today over $50 in one month, but
prefers $50 in one month over $40 today, we take $45 as the switching point and the
corresponding monthly discount factor as 0.9.6 We use the average across the three
choice sets of the calculated monthly discount factors, IDF, in the main analysis.7 We
also test for the fact that we elicit an interval and not a point estimation of IDFs (see
below). Importantly, the research question at hand needs only a reliable measure of the
heterogeneity in IDFs across individuals and not necessarily precise point estimates of
the level of the IDFs.
The order of the three time frames was randomized, and the same three experi-
menters explained the choices to the subjects. The researchers told the subjects that
they were required to choose either the smaller, earlier reward or the larger, later
reward for each decision pair. The experimenters also explained that 10 percent of
individuals would be randomly paid one of their choices. This was done by giving
subjects, at the end of their tax ﬁling, raﬄe tickets that indicated which choice, if
any, would be eﬀective. To ensure credibility of the payments, we ﬁlled out money
orders for the winning amounts on the spot in the presence of the participants, put
them in labeled, pre-stamped envelopes, and sealed the envelopes. The payments were
guaranteed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, and individuals were informed that
they could always return to the VITA site where the experiment was run to report any
problems receiving the payments.8 Money orders were sent by mail to the winners’
home addresses, either on that day (if t = 0) or in one, six, or seven months, depending
on the winner’s choice. The payment procedure therefore mimicked a front-end-delay
design (Harrison et al., 2005).9
6Therefore, individuals’ discount factors are calculated: IDFτ = X∗/50.
7We also test whether IDFs measured in each of the three price lists are associated with becoming
informed, and indeed they are.
8In fact, one participant returned to the VITA site, almost seven months after the experiment to
ask about his payment. He was, however, three days too early, and received the payment on time.
9If individuals expect to move in the next seven months, they may question the likelihood of their
9Measuring time preferences with incentivized multiple price lists has many advan-
tages over other approaches (Frederick et al., 2002), but the method also has challenges
that must be addressed.
First, the price lists do not elicit point estimates of the IDFs but rather ranges
of where the IDFs lie (see Coller and Williams, 1999, for details). Especially for
individuals who accept the smaller, earlier payment in all choices, the interval will be
relatively large, as the subjects might have accepted even lower amounts than oﬀered at
the earlier time. To address this issue, we show that the results are robust to estimation
with interval regressions (as suggested by Harrison et al., 2005).
Second, individuals’ decisions concerning the price lists may be aﬀected by either
their outside lending or their outside borrowing opportunities (see Harrison et al.,
2005). On the one hand, an individual who can lend at an interest rate higher than the
implied interest rate oﬀered in the multiple price list should arbitrage the experiment
by taking earlier payments. However, the lowest implied interest rate oﬀered in the
choice experiment for τ = 1 was 27 percent per year, which is diﬃcult to match in
the real world. Some of the interest rates for τ = 6 were substantially lower, making
it is easier to ﬁnd more favorable investment opportunities outside the experiment. If
outside investment opportunities play a role, individuals should appear more impatient
if τ = 6 than if τ = 1. But individuals exhibit higher (not lower) IDFs if τ =
6 than if τ = 1 (p < 0.001). Outside investment opportunities, therefore, do not
seem to drive the experimental results. On the other hand, a person who can borrow
at a rate lower than the experimentally oﬀered rate should arbitrage the experiment
by waiting for later payments. The individual may appear patient while actually
arbitraging the experiment by borrowing externally at a lower rate and repaying later
mail being forwarded to their new address in a timely manner. As movers might therefore prefer
payments in the present for logistical reasons and not for reasons related to their underlying time
preference, we ask individuals “Do you expect to move in the next 7 months?” Including the answer
to this question does not aﬀect our results.
10with earnings from the experiment. Because the implied interest rates in the experiment
are large (especially in the case of τ = 1), this is relatively easy to do. However, not
many individuals consistently choose the later, larger payments to take advantage of
the apparent arbitrage opportunity. Since the implied IDFs are rather small and
signiﬁcantly less than one (p < 0.001), outside borrowing opportunities do not seem to
drive the experimental results.
Third, the measurement of IDFs by observing individuals’ switching points in price
lists implicitly assumes that utility is linear over the payments in question. This proce-
dure simpliﬁes the analysis considerably and is consistent with expected utility theory,
which implies that consumers are approximately risk neutral over small stakes outcomes
(Rabin, 2000). However, some researchers have argued that parameters estimated from
price lists may also capture diﬀerences across individuals in the degree of curvature of
the utility function (Andersen et al., 2008).10 We therefore test whether diﬀerences
in risk aversion aﬀect our results using a question on general risk attitudes previously
validated with a large, representative sample (Dohmen et al., 2005). The question
reads as follows: “How willing are you to take risks in general? (on a scale from 0
“unwilling” to 10“fully prepared”). While risk aversion is correlated with measured
time preferences, it does not aﬀect the results of this paper.
Fourth, in order to measure an IDF, an individual must exhibit a unique switching
point in each choice set. Around 11 percent do not exhibit a unique switching point in
one or more price lists. In the main analysis we focus on the 778 individuals who show
a unique switching point in all choice sets. Individuals who have multiple switching
points within a choice set are neither more nor less likely to sign up for the counseling
sessions. When we include these individuals in a robustness test by taking their ﬁrst
10Attributing our experimental responses to risk preferences alone yields unrealistically high levels
of risk aversion. For a discussion of the high stakes implications of even moderate risk aversion over
small stakes see Rabin (2000).
11switching point, the results do not change.
3 Results
Of all individuals oﬀered the short credit counseling session, only 55 percent opted to
acquire ﬁnancial information, while the rest declined. The role of individuals’ time
preferences in this decision is presented in three steps. First, we present descriptive
statistics of the diﬀerence between participants and non-participants. Second, the
direct association between time preferences and the decision to participate in the credit
counseling program is investigated in a multivariate regression analysis. Third, we
present the association between time preferences and prior ﬁnancial knowledge and the
joint eﬀect of time preferences and prior knowledge on the decision to participate in
the program.
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
There is a clear diﬀerence in time preferences between individuals who select into
acquiring information and those who decide not to become informed. Table 1 shows
that individuals who choose to participate in the counseling session have an IDF of
0.85, compared with an IDF of 0.78 for individuals who choose not to participate
(p < 0.001).11 Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution of the IDFs for the two
groups. The ﬁgure illustrates that individuals who select to acquire information have
substantially higher IDFs. To put it diﬀerently, individuals who selected into credit
counseling chose the $50 in the future an average of 12 times out of 22 choices, while
individuals who selected not to receive counseling chose the larger, later reward only 9
times.
11We use t-tests to compare means until otherwise noted.
12[Table 1 and Figure 1 about here]
Table 1 compares other characteristics of the individuals who choose to receive the
short counseling session and those who decline the oﬀer.12 The comparison of the two
self-selected groups shows that they hardly diﬀer in observable basic demographic char-
acteristics. Also, the two groups do not diﬀer in income levels. Therefore, the variables
regularly controlled for in evaluation studies of educational programs (demographics
and income), do not seem to diﬀer sharply between the two groups.
The two groups, however, diﬀer starkly in both educational level and whether they
know what a credit score is. Participants in the educational program are more likely
to have college experience (p < 0.01) and are more likely to know what a credit score
is (p < 0.01). Both variables are potentially correlated with time preferences (because
their levels reﬂect investments in human capital) and appear to be correlated with the
participation decision. Controlling for education is important, since it could be a proxy
for cognitive abilities, which might inﬂuence IDFs (Benjamin et al., 2006). To avoid
omitted variable bias in our analysis, in the next sections we control for education,
whether people knowing what a credit score is and additional control variables.
3.2 The Eﬀect of Time Preferences on Participation
As shown in the descriptive statistics, time preferences are highly correlated with the
decision to participate in a ﬁnancial education program. As other factors also correlate
with this decision, especially education, in the following analysis we control for socio-
demographic variables. Table 2 presents logit regressions where the dependent variable
is 1 if the individual participated in the credit counseling program and 0 otherwise. To
the basic regression in column (1) we add exogenous demographic characteristics age,
12The number of observation diﬀers due to availability of information for certain questions. Impor-
tantly, even though the number of observations varies depending on the control variables we use, the
eﬀect of time preferences on acquiring information remains the same for each sample.
13race and gender in column (2); and then in column (3) additional socio-demographic
variables education, income and number of dependents, which may be endogenous to
an individual’s discount factor. In all regressions, we also control for the day individuals
were oﬀered the education program.
Column (1) shows the simple association between IDF and the counseling partici-
pation decision. The marginal eﬀect (not shown) is 0.59 for a change in the IDF from
0 to 1. This means that a change in the IDF of one standard deviation increases the
probability that a person acquires information by about 10 percentage points. Adding
control variables has little eﬀect on this association. The coeﬃcients range from 2.4
to 2.7, and the respective marginal eﬀects range from 0.59 to 0.66. Column (2) shows
that the eﬀect of IDF on the decision to participate in the counseling program holds
when controlling for basic demographic characteristics. The probability of acquiring
information increases with age and for African-Americans. Column (3) adds additional
socio-demographic variables. The results show that, among these additional variables,
only education is signiﬁcantly associated with the decision to acquire information. The
relationship between time preferences and counseling participation is, however, little
changed by the inclusion of education and income variables.
[Table 2 about here]
Column (4) in Table 2 extends the list of control variables. The regression controls
for whether the individual is a native English speaker, whether he or she expects to
move in the next seven months, his or her attitudes toward risk (on a scale from 0,
“unwilling,” to 10, “fully prepared”),13 whether he or she holds at least one credit
card, and whether his or her current outstanding balance is greater than $1,000. The
results in column (4) show that none of the newly added variables is signiﬁcant. In the
13The risk measure is treated as a continuous variable. The result does not change, however, if we
use dummies for each of the points on the 11-point scale.
14remainder of the analysis we do not present results including these additional control
variables. The results of each regression, however, are maintained with their inclusion.14
As our method of measuring time preferences produces an interval rather than a
point estimate of an individual’s IDF, we test whether the results hold in an interval
regression (Stewart, 1983). Table 3 has the interval of IDF as the dependent variable.
Column (1) in Table 3 shows that the previous result is also supported in an interval
regression. Individuals who participate in the credit counseling program have higher
discount factors, i.e. discount the future less. The association remains when we control
for socio-demographic characteristics.
[Table 3 about here]
Previous research using interval regression techniques for a representative sample
of Danish consumers has shown that some socio-deomographic variables and and the
time horizons over which time preferences are elicited correlate with measured discount
factors (Harrison et al., 2002). Column (3) of Table 3 allows us to compare whether
the same factors correlate with our estimated discount factors for a sample of LMI
individuals as those for a representative sample in Denmark (Harrison et al., 2002,
: Table 2). The results for the two samples show similar qualitative patterns: the
longer the time period, τ, the higher the discount factor; the relationship between
age and discount factors is u-shaped; more educated individuals have higher discount
factors; and income is positively associated with discount factors. The one notable
diﬀerence is in the eﬀect of gender. Our results, unlike those of the Danish sample,
show that females are signiﬁcantly more patient than males. In general, however, socio-
demographic characteristics seem to have similar eﬀects in both our LMI sample of US
consumers and the representative sample of Danish consumers.
14These results can be obtained from the authors on request.
15The result that individuals with higher IDF choose to participate in the credit
counseling program is also robust to a number of additional tests. First, the association
between IDF and self-selection into credit counseling does not depend on which price
list we use to measure individual discount factors. In the main analysis, we take the
average, IDF, but all three separate measures of IDF are strongly associated with
the decision to acquire personal ﬁnancial information (see Table A1 in the appendix).
Second, instead of using IDF to measure time preferences, we use the number of
patient decisions (that is, out of 22 choices, the number of times that the individual
opts for $50 later) and still ﬁnd a strong association between information acquisition
and individuals’ patience (see Table A2 in the appendix). Third, taking individuals’
ﬁrst switching point, the results are robust to including individuals who do not exhibit
unique switching points (see Table A3 in the appendix).
In sum, the results show that choosing to receive a credit counseling session is
strongly associated with individuals’ discount factors. This association holds when
controlling for socio-demographic variables and for further characteristics potentially
correlated with time preferences. In the following subsection we analyze whether time
preferences are also associated with prior ﬁnancial information acquisition and whether
this prior knowledge can explain the relationship between time preference and the
decision to acquire information in our ﬁeld study.
3.3 Time Preferences and Prior Financial Knowledge
Time preferences should not only explain who will select into becoming informed in our
ﬁeld study, but also inﬂuence the acquisition of personal ﬁnancial information prior to
the ﬁeld study. To test this claim, we analyze responses to a simple question, in which
individuals self-report their knowledge about credit scoring. We create a dummy, Know
what score is, which is set equal to 1 for individuals’ reporting that they know what
16a credit score is, and 0 otherwise. Of the 568 individuals who answered the question,
had non-missing basic control variables, and exhibited a unique switching point in the
choice experiments, a substantial share (42 percent) did not know what a credit score
is.
[Table 4 about here]
Table 4 presents the association between time preferences and prior ﬁnancial knowl-
edge, that is, whether individuals know what a credit score is. Column (1) shows results
of a regression in which Know what score is is the dependent variable. The results show
that IDF is associated with prior knowledge. The more patient an individual, that is,
the higher an individual’s IDF, the more likely it is that she knows what a credit score
is. Not surprisingly, education and income are also substantial predictors of whether
individuals know what a score is. Better-educated and wealthier individuals are more
likely to know what a score is. The results, therefore, indicate that more patient
individuals are more knowledgable about personal ﬁnance prior to the ﬁeld study.
Columns (2) and (3) in Table 4 show the results of regressions in which the depen-
dent variable is the decision to participate in the counseling program. ‘Prior ﬁnancial
knowledge’ (Know What Score Is) is one of the independent variables. Column (2)
shows that without controlling for diﬀerences in time preferences, individuals who
have prior ﬁnancial knowledge are more likely to participate in the educational pro-
gram. Adding IDF to the equation does not substantially lower the inﬂuence of prior
ﬁnancial knowledge on the decision to participate. More importantly, however, con-
trolling for prior ﬁnancial knowledge does not substantially change the relationship
between time preferences and the decision to acquire information in the ﬁeld study.
In sum, patient individuals are more likely to acquire ﬁnancial information through
the short credit counseling program oﬀered in the ﬁeld study and are more knowledgable
17prior to the ﬁeld study. But given one’s prior ﬁnancial knowledge, time preferences are
still important for the decision to acquire further personal ﬁnancial information.
4 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper presents evidence that time preferences strongly matter for whether or not
individuals choose to inform themselves about personal ﬁnance. In a unique ﬁeld study,
we show that the more individuals discount the future, the lower is the probability
that they participate in a short, free ﬁnancial education program. The result holds
when controlling for prior investment in human capital—both general (for example,
education) and speciﬁc to ﬁnancial knowledge (for example, knowledge of credit scores).
The paper is able to at least partially answer the question of why, if ﬁnancial
information is so important, many individuals do not become ﬁnancially literate. If
becoming ﬁnancially literate is an investment in human capital, individuals who heavily
discount the future will be less likely to ﬁnd the investment to be attractive, and so
will remain ﬁnancially illiterate.
Our results have important implications for the evaluation of ﬁnancial education
programs and voluntary educational programs in general. Self-selection on time prefer-
ences in attending ﬁnancial education programs will aﬀect the results of most program
evaluation studies. For example, evidence on the positive eﬀect of credit counseling
programs (for example, Elliehausen et al., 2007; Hartarska and Gonzalez-Vega, 2006)
are most likely biased upwards. Our results indicate that individuals entering voluntary
ﬁnancial education programs care more about the future than those who decide not to
enter. Previous research has shown that these more patient, “treated” individuals are
more likely to have improved ﬁnancial outcomes regardless of whether they participate
in education programs. Measured eﬀects of “treatment” are therefore biased and the
18direction of the bias is towards overestimation of positive eﬀects.
Unbiased evidence on the eﬀect of ﬁnancial educational programs therefore requires
randomized treatment. Given the bias noted above, the estimated eﬀects should be
expected to be much smaller. In fact, Duﬂo and Saez (2003) ﬁnd very small eﬀects
in a randomized study. Additional, unbiased studies such as this one are needed to
evaluate whether promotion of educational programs will indeed have positive eﬀects
on individual ﬁnancial decision-making.
A second implication concerns eﬀorts to improve ﬁnancial decisions through ed-
ucational programs. Our results show that even when participation costs for such
programs are minimal, individuals who heavily discount the future choose to not par-
ticipate, preferring not to invest in ﬁnancial education. This implies that relying on
voluntary educational programs will not greatly aﬀect ﬁnancial literacy. These pro-
grams will likely not be taken up by the target population of ﬁnancial illiterates.
If, however, signiﬁcant externalities exist to low levels of individual ﬁnancial literacy
such as higher levels of bankruptcy discharge and low levels of retirement security (the
costs of which are at least partially borne by the general public), policy makers may be
well founded in desiring individuals to become more ﬁnancially informed. Concerned
policy makers are left with two options: either make ﬁnancial education mandatory or
ﬁnd a way to alter individual preferences with respect to the acquisition of ﬁnancial
information. Both approaches are problematic.
Making ﬁnancial education mandatory risks both irritating responsible consumers
and having little eﬀect on individuals who would have ignored the oﬀer of ﬁnancial
education had it been voluntary. Furthermore, there is very little evidence as to how,
and whether, mandatory programs, like the one introduced in the new U.S. bankruptcy
law, work. Bernheim et al. (2001), ﬁnd that state mandated ﬁnancial education for high
school students does increase future savings. Cole and Shastry (2007) show, however,
19that this result is sensitive both to the data used and the estimation techniques em-
ployed. Their ﬁndings do not support the conclusion that state mandated ﬁnancial
education increases future savings.
Maybe time preferences are not ﬁxed but can be altered to make the acquisition
of ﬁnancial information a more attractive investment. Becker and Mulligan (1997)
argue not only that time preferences inﬂuence investment in education, but also that
education can inﬂuence time preferences by making it easier for individuals to imagine
the future. Policy makers appear at times to organize eﬀorts aimed at changing the way
people think about the future. As it is unclear and unproven whether time preferences
can actually be changed, future research should investigate the relationship between
time preferences and abilities like planning and imagination. This will be crucial in
order to think about how time preferences are formed and, in turn, how to increase
ﬁnancial information acquisition for all consumers.
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Figure 1: Cumulative Distribution of IDF
24Table 1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3)
Total Non-Participants Participants t-tests
Individual Discount Factor
# of Observations 778 350 428
IDF 0.82 0.78 0.85 p < 0.001
(0.17) (0.17) (0.16)
Basic demographic variables
# of Observations 677 310 367
Age 37.74 38.81 36.83 p < 0.10
(14.88) (16.25) (13.57)
Race (African-American=1) 0.77 0.74 0.80 p < 0.10
(0.42) (0.44) (0.40)
Gender (Female = 1) 0.63 0.61 0.65 p = 0.26
(0.48) (0.49) (0.48)
Additional socio-demographic variables
# of Observations 618 286 332
College Experience (=1) 0.45 0.36 0.52 p < 0.01
(0.50) (0.48) (0.50)
Adjusted Gross Income 16,924 16,135 17,603 p = 0.19
(13,759) (13,926) (13,600)
Number of Dependents 0.47 0.44 0.50 p = 0.36
(0.81) (0.79) (0.83)
Prior ﬁnancial knowledge
# of Observations 568 255 313
Know What Score Is (=1) 0.57 0.50 0.64 p < 0.01
(0.49) (0.50) (0.48)
Notes: Means for sample with unique switching points in the choice experiments, with non-
missing variables for the respective block of variables plus non-missing variables in the blocks
above. Standard errors in parentheses. The last column shows p-value for a t-test of equal
means for participant and non-participant samples.
25Table 2: Time Preferences and Participation in Counseling Program
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IDF 2.4*** 2.32*** 2.36*** 2.87***
(.484) (.551) (.603) (.945)
Age .11*** .0807* .165**
(.04) (.0446) (.0821)
Age Squared -.001*** -.001* -.002**
(.0005) (.0005) (.001)
Race .399** .46** .599*
(.199) (.212) (.317)
Gender (Female=1) .185 .078 .327
(.179) (.198) (.326)




# of Dependents .0987 .0229
(.121) (.196)
Hold Credit Card (=1) .276
(.353)
CC Debt > $1000 .76
(.496)




Expect to Move (=1) .333
(.327)
Constant -1.75*** -3.8*** -3.77*** -5.06***
(.499) (.999) (1.2) (1.96)
Day dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log Likelihood -488.02 -415.61 -371.77 -371.77
# of Observations 778 677 618 317
Notes: Dependent variable: Participated in credit counseling program (=1).
Logit regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Level of signiﬁcance: * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
26Table 3: Time Preferences and Participation in Counseling Pro-
gram (Interval Regressions)
(1) (2) (3)
Participate in Program (=1) .096*** .076*** .073***
(.017) (.018) (.018)
Delta Time (τ=6) .033*** .033*** .033***
(.001) (.001) (.001)








Gender (Female=1) .085*** .067***
(.018) (.019)




# of Dependents .023*
(.012)
Constant .663*** .73*** .623***
(.016) (.076) (.103)
Day dummies Yes Yes Yes
Log Pseudolikelihood -6556.46 -5692.29 -5024.99
# of Observations 2,334 2,031 1,854
# of Individuals 778 677 618
Notes: Interval regressions (Stewart, 1983). Standard errors clustered on
individual level in parentheses.
Dependent variable: Interval of IDF. The interval of IDF is calculated as
follows (see also, Harrison et al., 2002): For each of the three price lists
and for each individual, we observe a range of possible IDFs from IDFlow
to IDFhigh. This results in three interval observations per individual. We
control for the diﬀerences in t and τ of the underlying price lists using the
variables Delta Time and Has Present which indicate whether the price
list involves a time delay of six months and whether the price list involves
the present, respectively.
Level of signiﬁcance: * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
27Table 4: Time Preferences, Prior Knowledge, and Participation in
Counseling Program
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable Know what score is Participation
IDF 1.13** 2.12***
(.566) (.636)
Know What Score Is (=1) .394** .345*
(.194) (.197)
Age .003 .053 .069
(.037) (.049) (.054)
Age Squared -6.58e-06 -.0007 -.0008
(.0004) (.0006) (.0007)
Race .033 .434** .466**
(.209) (.218) (.221)
Gender (Female=1) .632*** .142 .0464
(.197) (.203) (.211)
College Experience (=1) .981*** .312 .242
(.194) (.206) (.209)
Ln(Income) .18** .080 .042
(.091) (.092) (.095)
# of Dependents -.0552 .168 .128
(.124) (.124) (.128)
Constant -3.2*** -2.03* -3.61***
(1.03) (1.14) (1.3)
Day dummies No Yes Yes
Log Likelihood -353.82 -345.40 -339.78
# of Observations 568 568 568
Notes: Logit regressions. Standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variables: Column(1): Knows what a credit score is (=1); Column (2)
and (3): Participated in credit counseling program (=1).
Level of signiﬁcance: * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
28A Appendix
A.1 Instructions
As a tax ﬁler at this Volunteer Income Tax Assistance site you are automatically entered in a raﬄe
in which you could win up to $50. Just follow the directions below:
How It Works: In the boxes below you are asked to choose between smaller payments closer to
today and larger payments further in the future. For each row, choose one payment: either the smaller,
sooner payment or the later, larger payment. When you return this completed form, you will receive a
raﬄe ticket. If you are a winner, the raﬄe ticket will have a number on it from 1 to 22. These numbers
correspond to the numbered choices below. You will be paid your chosen payment. The choices you
make could mean a diﬀerence in payment of more than $35, so CHOOSE CAREFULLY!!!
RED BLOCK (Numbers 1 through 7): Decide between payment today and payment in one month
BLACK BLOCK (Numbers 8 through 15): Decide between payment today and payment in six
months
BLUE BLOCK (Numbers 16 through 22): Decide between payment in six months and payment in
seven months
Rules and Eligibility: For each possible number below, state whether you would like the earlier,
smaller payment or the later, larger payment. Only completed raﬄe forms are eligible for the raﬄe.
All prizes will be sent to you by normal mail and will be paid by money order. One out of ten raﬄe
tickets will be a winner. You can obtain your raﬄe ticket as soon as your tax ﬁling is complete. You
may not participate in the raﬄe if you are associated with the EITC campaign (volunteer, business
associate, etc.) or an employee (or relative of an employee) of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston or
the Federal Reserve System.
[Red Block; t = 0, τ = 1]
TODAY VS. ONE MONTH FROM TODAY WHAT WILL YOU DO IF YOU GET A NUMBER
BETWEEN 1 AND 7? Decide for each possible number if you would like the smaller payment for
sure today or the larger payment for sure in one month? Please answer for each possible number
(1) through (7) by ﬁlling in one box for each possible number.
Example: If you prefer $49 today in Question 1 mark as follows: X $49 today or $50 in one month
If you prefer $50 in one month in Question 1, mark as follows: $49 today or X $50 in one month
If you get number (1): Would you like to receive $49 today or $50 in one month
If you get number (2): Would you like to receive $47 today or $50 in one month
If you get number (3): Would you like to receive $44 today or $50 in one month
If you get number (4): Would you like to receive $40 today or $50 in one month
If you get number (5): Would you like to receive $35 today or $50 in one month
If you get number (6): Would you like to receive $29 today or $50 in one month
If you get number (7): Would you like to receive $22 today or $50 in one month
[Black Block; t = 0, τ = 6]
TODAY VS. SIX MONTHS FROM TODAY WHAT WILL YOU DO IF YOU GET A NUMBER
BETWEEN 8 AND 15? Now, decide for each possible number if you would like the smaller payment
for sure today or the larger payment for sure in six months? Please answer each possible number
(8) through (15) by ﬁlling in one box for each possible number.
If you get number (8): Would you like to receive $49 today or $50 in six months
If you get number (9): Would you like to receive $47 today or $50 in six months
If you get number (10): Would you like to receive $44 today or $50 in six months
If you get number (11): Would you like to receive $40 today or $50 in six months
If you get number (12): Would you like to receive $35 today or $50 in six months
If you get number (13): Would you like to receive $29 today or $50 in six months
If you get number (14): Would you like to receive $22 today or $50 in six months
29If you get number (15): Would you like to receive $14 today or $50 in six months
[Blue Block; t = 6, τ = 1]
SIX MONTHS FROM TODAY VS. SEVEN MONTHS FROM TODAY WHAT WILL YOU DO IF
YOU GET A NUMBER BETWEEN 16 AND 22? Decide for each possible number if you would
like the smaller payment for sure in six months or the larger payment for sure in seven months?
Please answer for each possible number (16) through (22) by ﬁlling in one box for each possible
number.
If you get number (16): Would you like to receive $49 in six months or $50 in seven months
If you get number (17): Would you like to receive $47 in six months or $50 in seven months
If you get number (18): Would you like to receive $44 in six months or $50 in seven months
If you get number (19): Would you like to receive $40 in six months or $50 in seven months
If you get number (20): Would you like to receive $35 in six months or $50 in seven months
If you get number (21): Would you like to receive $29 in six months or $50 in seven months
If you get number (22): Would you like to receive $22 in six months or $50 in seven months
30A.2 Appendix tables









Age .072* .075* .082*
(.043) (.043) (.045)
Age Squared -.0009* -.001* -.001*
(.0005) (.0005) (.0005)
Race .469** .433** .447**
(.212) (.211) (.212)
Gender (Female=1) .103 .108 .102
(.196) (.196) (.196)
College Experience (=1) .432** .438** .392**
(.194) (.195) (.195)
Ln(Income) .0265 .031 .0233
(.090) (.089) (.089)
# of Dependents .129 .113 .079
(.119) (.119) (.122)
Constant -2.79** -5.24*** -3.26***
(1.12) (1.57) (1.15)
Day dummies Yes Yes Yes
Log Likelihood -374.79 -374.88 -371.26
# of Observations 618 618 618
Notes: Dependent variable: Participated in credit counseling pro-
gram (=1). Logit regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Level of signiﬁcance: * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
31Table A2: Participation in Counseling Program and # of Pa-
tient Choices
(1) (2) (3)








Gender (Female=1) .212 .0995
(.178) (.197)




# of Dependents .107
(.12)
Constant -.256 -2.28*** -2.21**
(.337) (.844) (1.07)
Day dummies Yes Yes Yes
Log Likelihood -492.10 -419.22 -374.33
# of Observations 778 677 618
Notes: Dependent variable: Participated in credit counseling program
(=1). Logit regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Level of signiﬁcance: * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
32Table A3: IDF and Participation in Counseling Program
(Including Multiple Switchers)
(1) (2) (3)








Gender (Female=1) .189 .067
(.167) (.186)




# of Dependents .128
(.113)
Constant -1.82*** -3.13*** -3.17***
(.482) (.855) (1.09)
Day dummies Yes Yes Yes
Log Likelihood -552.08 -470.38 -421.28
# of Observations 872 751 687
Notes: Dependent variable: Participated in credit counseling pro-
gram (=1). Logit regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Level of signiﬁcance: * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
33